Editor’s note: Legislative activity and published opinion summaries have been published here with permission from the Michigan Judicial Institute’s “IMPACT” publication.
MICHIGAN COURT RULE CHANGES
Effective September 11, 2019, ADM File No. 2019-12 amended MCR 1.109, MCR 3.206, MCR 3.931, and MCR 3.961 to “enable family division courts to use the required case inventory form to administer cases while keeping the information confidential”; “[t]his change is intended to prevent providing information that could affect the safety of domestic violence victims and their children.” Staff Comment to ADM File No. 2019-12, issued September 11, 2019. In addition, the State Court Administrative Office (SCAO) has revised the following court forms “to comply with the court rule amendments found in ADM File No. 2019-12”:
- CCFD 24, Petition (Collaborative Law Process)
- CCFD 25, Petition (Consent Judgment)
- JC 04a, Petition (Delinquency Proceedings)
- JC 04b, Petition (Child Protective Proceedings)
- MC 01, Summons
- MC 21, Confidential Case Inventory (Domestic Relations and Juvenile Code)
See the September 17, 2019 SCAO Memorandum, Notice of Revisions to CCFD 24, CCFD 25, JC 04a, JC 04b, MC 01, and MC 21, for a brief explanation of the changes and a copy of the forms with the changes highlighted.
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS
PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED SEE: http://courts.mi.gov/courts/coa/opinions/pages/zipfiles.aspx.Johnson v Johnson, published opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 18, 2019 (Docket Nos. 345803; 345955).
CHILD CUSTODY – STAY OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT (SCRA)
“The SCRA provides protection to United States service members . . . by providing temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service,” and “[i]f the conditions in 50 USC 3932(b)(2) are satisfied, a stay of [any civil action, including any child custody proceeding] for a period of not less than 90 days is mandatory.” Johnson v Johnson, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The statute requires that four pieces of information be provided,” and “so long as the servicemember’s commanding officer makes the statements required in § 3932(b)(2)(B), only one document need be submitted.” Johnson, ___ Mich App at ___. Accordingly, where “plaintiff sought to invoke the protections of the SCRA” by “submitt[ing] a letter signed by herself and by her commanding officer,” “the trial court erred when it interpreted the statute as requiring two separate letters.” Id. at ___. However, “[c]ontrary to 50 USC 3932(b)(2)(A), plaintiff failed to set forth facts stating the manner in which her current military duty materially affected her ability to appear for the show cause hearing,” and “offered no explanation for why or how her duties materially affected her ability to appear for the contempt proceedings”; “[a]s a result, plaintiff’s letter did not satisfy the first condition in § 3932(b)(2)(A).” Johnson, ___ Mich App at ___. “In addition, plaintiff failed to state ‘a date when the servicemember will be available to appear,’” and “[b]ecause 50 USC 3932(b)(2)(A) expressly requires that the application for a stay include a date when the servicemember will be available to appear, plaintiff’s statement providing only an anticipated and possible date to appear—telephonically only—is not sufficient to meet the condition set forth in 50 USC 3932(b)(2)(A).” Johnson, ___ Mich App at ___. Accordingly, “[b]ecause the statutory conditions in 50 USC 3932(b)(2)(A) were not met,” “[t]he trial court’s denial of a stay under 50 USC 3932(b)(2) is affirmed.” Johnson, ___ Mich App at ___.
CHILD CUSTODY – TEMPORARY CHANGE AND EX PARTE ORDER
“An evidentiary hearing is mandated before custody can be modified, even on a temporary basis,” and “[r]egardless of whether a court is establishing custody in an original matter or altering a prior custody order, the trial court must determine if the change of custody is in the children’s best interests and, to that end, must make specific findings of fact regarding each of the 12 statutory best-interest factors.” Johnson v Johnson, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, “the trial court abused its discretion in modifying custody because it did not hold an evidentiary hearing, make the necessary determinations, or provide the required notice.” Id. at ___. Moreover, even if the trial court granted temporary custody to the defendant based on MCR 3.207(B), “ex parte orders issued under MCR 3.207 that affect child custody must comply with specific notice requirements,” and assuming “the ex parte order was supported by admissible evidence, it nonetheless failed to comply with the notice requirements under MCR 3.207(B)(5) and (6).” Johnson, ___ Mich App at ___. “Furthermore, an ex parte order becomes a temporary order if no objection is made,” and because “even temporary changes in custody require an evidentiary hearing at some point,” “even assuming that the initial ex parte order was valid and complied with the notice requirements, the trial court was still required to hold an evidentiary hearing in the future and consider the children’s best interests,” and “[t]he failure to do so was clear error and plain error.” Id. at ___.
Hernandez v Mayoral-Martinez, published opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 23, 2019 (Docket No. 347131).
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (UCCJEA) – HOME STATE AND SIGNIFICANT CONNECTIONS
“The UCCJEA governs child-custody proceedings involving Michigan and a proceeding or party outside of the state,” and “a court can assert jurisdiction when Michigan is the child’s home state or was the home state within six months of the commencement of the proceedings.” Hernandez v Mayoral-Martinez, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019). “Home state is defined as ‘the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.’” Id. at ___, quoting MCL 722.1102(g). Where the minor child had been living in Mexico for more than a year before the child custody proceedings commenced, “Michigan was not the child’s home state nor had it been in the prior six months,” and “[t]he circuit court correctly concluded that it did not have home-state jurisdiction.” Hernandez, ___ Mich App at ___. “When Michigan is not the child’s home state, the next question is whether another state is the child’s home state”; however, where the minor child had been living in Mexico with her maternal grandmother but “the grandmother had not been awarded legal custody of the child,” the grandmother did not constitute “a person acting as a parent” under MCL 722.1102(m)(ii), and “[t]he circuit court therefore erred in ruling that Mexico was the child’s home state.” Hernandez, ___ Mich App at ___. “When there is no home state the next step is to consider whether Michigan has ‘significant connections’ jurisdiction under MCL 722.1201(1)(b)”; however, remand was necessary because “the circuit court only partially considered whether it had significant-connections jurisdiction”—“the fact that the child was born in Michigan, as well [as] her parents’ continued presence here” evidences “a sufficient connection to the state for purposes of MCL 722.1201(1)(b),” and because “there is substantial evidence of [the best-interests] factors in Michigan,” and “both parents have resided in Michigan for some time, it would seem that there is sufficient evidence here for the circuit court to make such a determination.” Hernandez, ___ Mich App at ___.
In re Richardson, published opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 25, 2019 (Docket Nos. 346903; 346904).
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE
“Drug use alone, in the absence of any connection to abuse or neglect, cannot justify termination solely through operation of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect”; accordingly, where “[t]he condition that led to mother’s adjudication was her use of marijuana during her pregnancy that caused [the minor child] to be born testing positive for marijuana,” but “by the time of the termination hearing, there was no evidence that mother’s use of medical marijuana was having any negative effect on her ability to parent or causing any risk of harm to [the minor child],” “the referee placed far too great an emphasis on the fact that mother consumed medical marijuana.” In re Richardson, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The record does not support the conclusion that there was clear and convincing evidence that mother continued to have an issue with substance abuse that presented an actual risk of harm to [the minor child],” and “[t]he concerns expressed . . . were based more on the referee’s speculation that mother’s use of medical marijuana might lead to creating a harmful environment for [the minor child] even though the overwhelming evidence related to mother’s current medical marijuana use and parenting skills indicated just the opposite.” Id. at ___. “Without such evidence, there was not clear and convincing evidence to show that mother had not rectified the condition that led to her adjudication [under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)] or that mother could not provide proper care and custody [under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)], and the trial court therefore committed clear error by terminating mother’s parental rights.” Id. at ___. “With respect to father, whose parental rights were also terminated essentially due to mother’s medical marijuana use as well, the record similarly does not support the referee’s determination that statutory grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence”; “[t]hus, the trial court clearly erred by terminating his parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) as well.” Richardson, ___ Mich App at ___.
Moote v Moote, published opinion of the Court of Appeals, released August 27, 2019 (Docket No. 346527).
CUSTODY – CHANGE OF DOMICILE, 100-MILE RULE, AND D’ONOFRIO FACTORS
“[W]hen a parent moves for leave to change a child’s domicile by a distance of more than 100 miles, the trial court must consider the request using the following four-part analysis”: (1) “determine whether the moving party has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the factors enumerated in MCL 722.31(4), the so-called D’Onofrio factors, support a motion for a change of domicile”; (2) “if the factors support a change in domicile . . . determine whether an established custodial environment exists”; (3) “if an established custodial environment exists . . . determine whether the change of domicile would modify or alter that established custodial environment”; and (4) “if, and only if . . . a change of domicile would modify or alter the child’s established custodial environment . . . determine whether the change in domicile would be in the child’s best interests by considering whether the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23 have been established by clear and convincing evidence.” Moote v Moote, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019) (cleaned up). Here, “the trial court’s findings concerning the D’Onofrio factors as set forth in MCL 722.31(4) were not against the great weight of the evidence” where (1) under MCL 722.31(4)(a), “the trial court found that the proposed relocation had the capacity to improve the quality of life for both [the minor child] and [the plaintiff mother]” because “the trial court determined that the move would provide plaintiff with a [family] support system that would benefit [the minor child]”; (2) under MCL 722.31(4)(b), “plaintiff proposed a new parenting-time schedule that would still allow [the defendant father] to exercise substantial parenting time,” and “[p]laintiff also suggested that [the minor child] and defendant could maintain contact through videoconference software”; (3) under MCL 722.31(4)(c), “the trial court opined that it was possible to modify the parenting-time schedule in a manner that could provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parental relationship between defendant and [the minor child]” where “defendant would exercise more overnights with [the minor child] under the new [parenting-time] schedule than under the alternating weekend schedule”; (4) under MCL 722.31(4)(d), “the record supports a conclusion that plaintiff’s motion was not motivated by a desire to secure a financial advantage with respect to a support obligation”; and (5) under MCL 722.31(4)(e), while “both parties alleged domestic violence during the marriage,” “there is no indication that this played a role in the trial court’s consideration of plaintiff’s request for relocation.” Moote, ___ Mich App at ___ (cleaned up). Further, “an established custodial environment existed with plaintiff” because the minor child “lived with plaintiff, and plaintiff was responsible for [the minor child’s] educational and health needs.” Id. at ___. Finally, because “[p]laintiff’s move [out of state] with [the minor child] would only change [the minor child’s] domicile,” but “would not change [the minor child’s] established custodial environment with plaintiff,” “the trial court’s failure to address the best interest factors was neither erroneous nor an abuse of discretion.” Id. at ___.
Pennington v Pennington, published opinion of the Court of Appeals, released September 12, 2019 (Docket No. 348090).
CHILD CUSTODY MODIFICATION – PROPER CAUSE OR CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND ESTABLISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT
Proper Cause or Change of Circumstances. “[A] party seeking to modify an existing child custody order must first establish proper cause or a change of circumstances before the trial court may reopen the custody matter and hold a hearing to assess whether the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests,” and “[i]f the party seeking to change custody does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence either proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court is not authorized by the Child Custody Act to revisit an existing custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best-interest factors.” Pennington v Pennington, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019). Where “a review of the record indicates that plaintiff, rightly or wrongly, suspected [defendant’s] abuse of the child and took the child to her pediatrician, which set in motion the process involving [Child Protective Services] and law enforcement,” and “[d]efendant, upon learning that plaintiff had set in motion this process, brought a motion to change custody, alleging that plaintiff had mental health problems,” but “[n]o medical evidence of plaintiff’s mental health was presented,” “the trial court’s conclusion . . . that a change of circumstances and proper cause had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence was against the great weight of the evidence.” Id. at ___. Later, the defendant filed a second motion for a change of custody while the parties’ custody arrangement was governed by an interim order; “the trial court was obligated to determine whether defendant had demonstrated proper cause or a change of circumstances since entry of the [earlier] order,” but “failed to make a threshold finding on defendant’s new motion for change of custody,” and “therefore erred by reaching the issue of the best interest of the child without first properly determining whether proper cause or change of circumstances had been established.” Id. at ___.
Established Custodial Environment. “When modification of a custody order changes to whom the child looks for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort and support, the movant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the change is in the child’s best interests.” Pennington v Pennington, ___ Mich App ___, ___ (2019). Where “[a]t the time of the . . . hearing on defendant’s motion for change of custody, the child was approximately three and a half years old, and had lived almost exclusively with plaintiff for her entire life,” and “[t]here was virtually no evidence that, over an appreciable time, the child had looked to defendant in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort,” “the trial court’s finding that the child had an established custodial environment with defendant was almost entirely without support, and therefore was against the great weight of the evidence.” Id. at ___. “The trial court therefore was precluded from changing the child’s custody unless defendant presented clear and convincing evidence that the change was in the best interests of the child,” and “[t]he trial court thus erred in changing custody upon a finding that the change was supported by only a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at ___.
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
Under Michigan court rule, unpublished decisions are not considered authoritative. They are cited here to illustrate points of interest for future similar cases.Kenneally v Goulet, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 4, 2019 (Docket No. 343744). The trial court did not err in considering under the “catch all” custody factor that defendant’s move of 130 miles to further her relationship with her boyfriend demonstrated that she had put her own needs before the child’s needs.
Simonds v Simonds, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 8, 2019 (Docket No. 345286). The trial court abused its discretion in entering the spousal support order beginning after child support ended because child support is a child’s right and cannot be bargained away by spousal support which must balance the incomes and needs of the parties without impoverishing either party.
Zhang v Li, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 11, 2019 (Docket No. 346872). The child’s speech and autism-like characteristics – unknown at the time the original custody order entered – constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to revisit the custody order, but the trial court erred by entering an interim order changing custody without determining the child’s established custodial environment and making best-interest findings.
Zelasko v Zelasko, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 13, 2019 (Docket No. 342854). The trial court did not err in entering a judgment of divorce including the arbitrator’s award of $15,000,000 to plaintiff from defendant’s lottery winnings five years after the parties separated. The arbitrator correctly observed the factors for apportioning assets in a divorce and the defendant could not demonstrate the award was inequitable.
Page v Page, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 18, 2019 (Docket No. 346872). The trial court could properly find that a change in residence from Michigan to Louisiana in which the plaintiff would double her earnings was sufficient to improve the capacity of the move to improve the children’s quality of life.
Steele v Hertzfeld, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 18, 2019 (Docket No. 345664). In a change of domicile motion, if the moving party cannot meet the burden of proof that a change in domicile is warranted, then a best interests analysis is not required even when the trial court determines an established custodial environment exists with both parties.
Siesel v Poutney, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 18, 2019 (Docket No. 346930). Although plaintiff and defendant disagreed on the children’s extracurricular activities and cell phone usage, defendant’s decisions as sole legal custodian were not arbitrary or capricious so as to establish the issues were different than normal life changes in dealing with the children’s schedules.
Legro v Lechner, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 24, 2019 (Docket No. 347149). Because the Massachusetts court properly exercised jurisdiction over the case in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA, the circuit court correctly concluded that it was required to enforce the Massachusetts custody determination.
Labrie v Labrie, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 25, 2019 (Docket No. 344339). The trial court erred in imputing income to the plaintiff for purposes of setting spousal support when no evidence was shown that she could obtain a job in her former profession, that her training still applied, the amount of time and expenses it may take to become re-employed, and that she would be able to work much longer before reaching retirement age.
Delekta v Delekta, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 27, 2019 (Docket No. 345006). The court did not err in determining, based on the parties’ past strained relationship, that although the children preferred to live with plaintiff and suffered anxiety in defendant’s home, these were not new circumstances and therefore insufficient to revisit custody.
Tooson v Flowers, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released June 27, 2019 (Docket No. 346868). The trial court did not err by hearing plaintiff’s motion for specific parenting time but did not make a determination regarding whether an established custodial environment existed, and accordingly, erred by not making a determination whether plaintiff’s motion would modify an established custodial environment.
Carr v Carr, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 18, 2019 (Docket No. 345820). 2017 MCSF 2.01(G)(4)(c) clearly requires trial courts to address each imputation factor—if only to state that it does not apply—and to “articulate” the information that is relevant to that factor, and the failure to do so causes the imputation to be out of compliance with the MCSF.
Cavanaugh v Cavanaugh, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 18, 2019 (Docket No. 346997). Evidence that defendant was behaving, postjudgment, in a manner that sought to disparage plaintiff and interfere with the child’s relationship with plaintiff, and that this was causing the child stress, anxiety, and depression, was proper cause to reexamine the issue of custody.
Haney v Haney, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 23, 2019 (Docket No. 342019). The trial can could modify all aspects of earlier spousal support orders, including extending support until further order of the court and removing provisions that spousal support would end upon a party’s remarriage.
Brenner v Kerkstra, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 23, 2019 (Docket No. 346078). The trial court erred when it (1) failed to determine whether sexual abuse allegations against the mother’s husband constituted proper cause or a change of circumstances to revisit custody and (2) although it found the parties had a “joint-type arrangement,” it did not determine whether there was an established custodial environment with both parents.
Fawaz v Flynn, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 23, 2019 (Docket No. 346807). Although the court did not specifically state it found proper cause to change custody, its following observations made it clear the court implicitly found proper cause: the child was in a “traumatic crisis period”; there were allegations of physical abuse; CPS had removed the child; the court was relying on CPS’s recommendation for the child to stay with the defendant; the court could not fully assess the child’s best interests at the time; and the court needed to protect the child.
Organek v Organek, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released July 25, 2019 (Docket No. 343441). When plaintiff’s father testified that he gave her money to help pay her mortgage, then plaintiff, her father, and her mother each testified that the money was a loan that plaintiff would repay when she was financially able although there was no written loan agreement, and finally plaintiff’s certified public accountant testified that plaintiff included the money from her parents as gift income to claim a homestead property tax credit in 2016, the trial court properly included this money from plaintiff’s parents as plaintiff’s income for its 2017 child support calculation.
Bauer v Waidelich, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released August 6, 2019 (Docket No. 345756). Because this legal custody dispute focused narrowly on medical decision making, the appellate court could not say that the trial court’s decision not to interview the children, who were 8 and 9 years old at the time, regarding their preference constituted error requiring reversal.
Mink v Mink, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released August 15, 2019 (Docket No. 347536). There was proper cause to revisit custody when, for the three years preceding the filing of plaintiff’s motion to change custody, plaintiff and defendant shared joint legal and physical custody of the minor child who, the parties agree, suffered from anxiety-driven enuresis and constipation, and where, in the motion, plaintiff contended that defendant was neglecting the child’s care, including failing to comply with the child’s psychologist’s recommendations for alleviating the child’s anxiety.
LaBarre v LaBarre, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released August 15, 2019 (Docket No. 346508). The trial court did not clearly err by adopting the referee’s recommendation to maintain joint legal custody, nor by not independently considering the best-interest factors, because a trial court is required to confirm that the referee considered the child’s best interests or make its own findings of fact regarding the best-interest factors before modifying custody.
Mansfield v Mansfield, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released August 22, 2019 (Docket No. 347408). The trial court purportedly changed parenting time, but the change was so substantial that it was in effect a change in custody, which would have been improper had the trial court not also revisited its earlier findings on the best interest factors.
Brown v Walker, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released September 5, 2019 (Docket No. 345917). The trial court erred in not considering joint custody for the parties, but the error was harmless because the trial court found that awarding custody to defendant would not be in the child’s best interests, and the plaintiff prevailed in obtaining sole custody based on the heightened clear-and-convincing standard of evidence.
Selvig v Smith, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released September 12, 2019 (Docket No. 343514). Previously finding a party in contempt of court for violating a parenting time order does not confer jurisdiction on the court to address future parenting time issues where the parties consented to another state exercising jurisdiction in the case.
Roberts v Roberts, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released September 12, 2019 (Docket No. 347991). The trial court did not err when, at the hearing on defendant’s motions to change custody and parenting time, the court noted that the only “change” it perceived was plaintiff’s move from a two-bedroom to a one-bedroom apartment and determined that this move was insufficient to trigger reconsideration of custody. Plaintiff’s reliance on babysitters did not amount to a change in circumstances or proper cause to revisit the custody issue, especially as defendant had exercised only 52 of his allotted 75 overnight visits over the past year.
Joseff v Joseff, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released September 12, 2019 (Docket No. 344423). Michigan courts have an inherent power at common law to punish contempts of court, which the Legislature lacks authority to constrain through statute, and the court could hold the plaintiff in contempt for disobeying its orders without relying on the general contempt statute.
Gable v Merrill, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, released September 19, 2019 (Docket No. 347814). The trial court possessed authority to sanction plaintiff for her tardiness at the referee hearing, but the court could not change the children’s physical custody without allowing plaintiff to offer evidence at the de novo hearing despite her previous tardiness.
SCAO ADM 2019-05 (October 23, 2019) Implementing Friend of the Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Plans
MCR 3.224 is effective January 1, 2020, and requires courts to adopt an FOC alternative dispute resolution (ADR) plan. The plan must be consistent with SCAO standards and include minimum qualifications and training requirements. This memorandum provides guidance for courts submitting FOC ADR plans to SCAO for approval.
(September 25, 2019) Updated: Family Division Case Inventory Form
Updates to MCR 3.206(A)(3), in conjunction with updates to MCR 1.109, required persons filing a case initiating document in a domestic relations proceeding to attach a case inventory and serve it on the other party. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide guidance regarding which cases should be included on the case inventory.
On September 11, 2019, the court adopted changes to MCR 1.109 and 3.206(A)(3) that make the case inventory confidential, meaning it is no longer subject to service requirements in MCR 3.203, and it is available only to the party that filed it, the filing party’s attorney, the court, and the friend of the court. These changes were made to enable family division courts to administer cases while ensuring information is not disclosed that could affect the safety of domestic violence victims and their children.
MICHIGAN IV-D MEMORANDUMS (OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT)
This IV-D Memorandum announces revisions to health care coverage provisions in the Friend of the Court Act and the Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act (SPTEA). Many of the revisions implement a revised federal regulation that broadened the definition of health care coverage to include public health care coverage. The federal regulation and state law revisions allow parents to fulfill their obligation to provide health care coverage for their child(ren) by obtaining and maintaining public health care coverage. The state law revisions also update other medical support provisions.
OCS will implement the policy, system and form changes required by the revised health care coverage provisions at a future date.
This IV-D Memorandum also announces a temporary revision to the Uniform Child Support Order (USO) forms in the Michigan Child Support Enforcement System (MiCSES). Text that incorporates the revised state and federal law will be inserted in paragraph 13 and will replace the standard insurance provision in the USO. This text will appear in the USO starting December 6, 2019 with the MiCSES 10.2.2 Release.
2019-021 (December 19, 2019) Changes to Annual Security Requirements for IV-D Staff and Updates to Michigan IV-D Child Support Manual Section 1.10, “Confidentiality/Security”
This IV-D Memorandum announces significant changes to OCS’s annual security requirements for IV-D staff, as well as changes to federal tax information (FTI) safeguarding requirements. Other updates to Section 1.10 include additions or revisions to policy in the following areas: updates to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) safeguarding requirements; penalties for wrongful disclosure of confidential IV-D information; reporting security incidents to the Michigan Department of Treasury; suspicious email reporting; penalties for wrongful disclosure of information in the Limited Access Death Master File (LADMF); making changes to an office’s Authorized Requester/IV-D contact list; disclosing conflicts of interest; system access requests for new IV-D workers; and biometric devices for the Central Paternity Registry/Birth Registry System (CPR/BRS).
Finally, this IV-D Memorandum introduces revisions to the following forms: IV-D Program Request for Computer Access (DHS-393); Security Incident Report (DHS-882); and Verification of Confidentiality Compliance (Treasury 4092).
2019-020 (November 7, 2019) Introduction of Section 3.05, “Locate,” of the Michigan IV-D Child Support Manual and the Child Support Confidential Locate Request (DHS-1445) Form
This IV-D Memorandum announces the publication of Section 3.05, “Locate,” of the Michigan IV-D Child Support Manual. It also introduces the Child Support Confidential Locate Request (DHS-1445) form that should be used to request locate services from OCS Central Operations. Section 3.05 consolidates, clarifies, and reorganizes policy from previously published Action Transmittals (ATs), the Combined IV-D Policy Manual, the Child Support Manual, and the Friend of the Court (FOC) Manual.
2019-019 (October 17, 2019) Update to the County IV-D User Remote Access Request (MDHHS-5454)
This IV-D Memorandum announces a minor change to an OCS address listed on the County IV-D User Remote Access Request (MDHHS-5454).
2019-018 (September 23, 2019) Revisions to Customer Contact Letters to Create User-Friendly Communications
This IV-D Memorandum announces revisions to several OCS customer contact letters, including redesigned the letters to include icons, more white space, and simpler language to make the letters easier for customers to read.
2019-017 (September 16, 2019) Terminating Income Withholding and Credit Reporting on Fully Closed MiCSES Cases
This IV-D Memorandum introduces updated policy regarding terminating income withholding notices (IWNs) and credit reporting enforcement activities on fully closed MiCSES cases. OCS has created an IWN batch cleanup process to terminate IWNs on fully closed MiCSES cases. This process will ensure that the Michigan IV-D program properly terminates income withholding enforcement actions on fully closed MiCSES cases.
Additionally, OCS will modify an existing credit reporting batch process, to terminate credit reporting on fully closed MiCSES cases. The modified credit reporting batch will ensure that OCS discontinues reporting non-custodial parents to the credit reporting agencies when their MiCSES cases are fully closed.
2019-016 (September 4, 2019) Changes to County-Funded Agency Placement Referrals
Note: This Memorandum replaces Memorandum 2016-010, 2019-007
Beginning October 1, 2019, the Child Welfare Program will send Child Care Fund (CCF)-funded agency placement referrals as state-funded through the MiSACWIS/MiCSES interface. The Child Welfare Program will no longer send CCF-funded agency placement referrals as county-funded to MiCSES. OCS has incorporated this change into the Michigan IV-D Child Support Manual.
In addition, OCS has incorporated policy from IV-D Memorandum 2019-007, Agency Placement Referrals for Relative Unlicensed Providers and Court Action Referrals (CARs) for Unlicensed Providers into manual sections 2.85, 4.85, and 5.85.
Finally, in this memorandum, OCS provides an update regarding MiSACWIS referrals for relative unlicensed providers receiving foster care maintenance payments.
2019-015 (September 3, 2019) Changes to the Contract Performance Standards (CPS) Evaluation Process and Other CPS-Related Updates
Note: This Memorandum replaces Memorandum 2019-001
Note: This Memorandum replaces Memorandum 2019-001
This IV-D Memorandum announces several updates surrounding the Michigan IV-D program’s Contract Performance Standards (CPS) effort:
- An update regarding the Locate standard;
- Updates to the CPS evaluation process;
- The introduction of new reports related to the CPS training measures; and
- An update regarding changes that will be made to the CPS Business Objects reports in the Michigan Child Support Enforcement System (MiCSES) 10.2 Release on September 20, 2019.
This memorandum also announces updates to two exhibits and introduces six new exhibits.
2019-014 (August 19, 2019) Increases in the Federal Annual Fee (FED Fee) and the Disbursement Threshold for Fee Assessment
This IV-D Memorandum announces revisions to Section 5.70, “Fees (SF/PF, OSR and FFEE),” of the Michigan IV-D Child Support Manual. This manual section has been updated to discuss the amendment to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, Section 454(6)(B)(ii), effective October 1, 2018, which includes: an increase in the federal annual fee (FED fee) to $35; and an increase in the disbursement threshold for fee assessment to $550. OCS has updated Section 5.70 to clarify FED fee payment requirements on Food Assistance Program (FAP)-only IV-D cases. OCS has also added clarification about federal reporting of the Attorney General portion of the statutory fee.
